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The study investigates the neurocognitive stages involved in the speed-accuracy trade-off
(SAT). Contrary to previous approach, we did not manipulate speed and accuracy
instructions: participants were required to be fast and accurate in a go/no-go task, and we
selected post-hoc the groups based on the subjects’ spontaneous behavioral tendency.
Based on the reaction times, we selected the fast and slow groups (Speed-groups),
and based on the percentage of false alarms, we selected the accurate and inaccurate
groups (Accuracy-groups). The two Speed-groups were accuracy-matched, and the two
Accuracy-groups were speed-matched. High density electroencephalographic (EEG) and
stimulus-locked analyses allowed us to observe group differences both before and
after the stimulus onset. Long before the stimulus appearance, the two Speed-groups
showed different amplitude of the Bereitschaftspotential (BP), reflecting the activity of the
supplementary motor area (SMA); by contrast, the two Accuracy-groups showed different
amplitude of the prefrontal negativity (pN), reflecting the activity of the right prefrontal
cortex (rPFC). In addition, the post-stimulus event-related potential (ERP) components
showed differences between groups: the P1 component was larger in accurate than
inaccurate group; the N1 and N2 components were larger in the fast than slow group;
the P3 component started earlier and was larger in the fast than slow group. The go minus
no-go subtractive wave enhancing go-related processing revealed a differential prefrontal
positivity (dpP) that peaked at about 330 ms; the latency and the amplitude of this peak
were associated with the speed of the decision process and the efficiency of the stimulus-
response mapping, respectively. Overall, data are consistent with the view that speed
and accuracy are processed by two interacting but separate neurocognitive systems, with
different features in both the anticipation and the response execution phases.
Keywords: EEG, event related potentials (ERPs), decision making, speed-accuracy tradeoff, movement-related
cortical potentials (MRCPs), Bereitschaftspotential (BP)
INTRODUCTION
In a typical go/no-go task subjects are required to quickly respond
to go trials (e.g., pressing a button) and to refrain the response
to no-go trials. This task has been widely investigated because
it involves many cognitive processes, such as motor prepara-
tion (Rinkenauer et al., 2004; Berchicci et al., 2012), sensory
evidence accumulation (Burle et al., 2004; Perea et al., 2010),
decision-making (Schall, 2001; Heekeren et al., 2008), proactive
and reactive inhibition (Aron et al., 2004; Aron, 2011) and
motor response. The neural basis of these processing have been
investigated at various levels, from animal (Mishkin, 1964) to
humans (Konishi et al., 1998; Garavan et al., 1999; Konishi
et al., 1999). However, neurocognitive processes underlying the
perceptual decision-making are not entirely defined, and partic-
ularly the processes supporting the trade-off between speed and
accuracy of the response in the go/no-go task has received little
attention.
In the context of a perceptual discriminative task, decisions
can be viewed as a result of continuous accumulation of sensory
information from a baseline point until reaching a threshold
(Ratcliff, 1978). Fast decisions are more error prone, while careful
ones take longer (Wenzlaff et al., 2011); this phenomenon is
known as the speed-accuracy tradeoff (hereafter, SAT) (for a
review see Bogacz et al., 2010).
The cognitive models of decision making consider the SAT as
the outcome of an evidence accumulation process. One of the
most important accumulation models is the Ratcliff ’s diffusion
model (Ratcliff and Rouder, 2000; Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff and
Tuerlinckx, 2002; Ratcliff et al., 2004); this model considers the
response execution as a result of different processes, such as the
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quality of evidence accumulation, the decision criteria and the
stimulus encoding. This model assumes that decisions are taken
through a noisy process that accumulates information over time
(Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). Differently to the Ratcliff ’s model,
the leaky competing accumulator model (Usher and McClelland,
2001) also considers the effects of leakage and amplification of
differences (partly attributable to the noise), while the linear
ballistic accumulation model (Brown and Heathcote, 2005, 2008)
includes the between-trial variability in input strength and in the
starting point of accumulation. Summarizing, all the accumula-
tion models share the assumption that SAT can be explained by
changes in the distance between a baseline and a threshold, so that
a larger distance yield slower but more accurate responses (Reddi
and Carpenter, 2000; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al.,
2006; Simen et al., 2006). Computationally, a baseline increase
would be equivalent to a threshold decrease. Despite the large
amount of evidence supporting the modeling of behavioral results
according to mathematical models of decision-making, the neural
mechanisms for adjusting the baseline-to-threshold distance are
only partially understood (Kim and Lee, 2011).
Several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies
attempted to identify the brain regions involved in SAT by means
of instructions emphasizing either response speed or accuracy;
these studies used a Simon task with right/left hand response
(Forstmann et al., 2008a; van Veen et al., 2008) or a cued motion
direction discrimination task (Forstmann et al., 2008b, 2010;
Ivanoff et al., 2008). Forstmann et al. (2008b) showed that the
preparation for fast actions was associated with larger activity of
the anterior striatum and the rostral part of the supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA). Two other studies (Ivanoff et al., 2008;
van Veen et al., 2008) confirmed that speed emphasis leads to
greater activation in the striatum and pre-SMA, but showed also
the involvement of other areas: the premotor area (PMA), the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left parietal cortices.
Forstmann et al. (2008a) noted individual differences in the
task, i.e., under speed constraint some participants adjusted their
response thresholds more than others; the participants who had a
relatively large decrease in response caution also had a relatively
large increase in activation for the right anterior striatum and
right pre-SMA. On the other hand, none of these studies found
SAT-related changes in sensory cortical areas.
This latter result was also reported by the electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) studies on the SAT, which used tasks such as
Simon, flankers and letter recognition and focused on the motor
stages evaluating the lateralized readiness potential (LRP). Sangals
et al. (2002) found that time pressure increased the LRP ampli-
tude. Other studies (Osman et al., 2000; van der Lubbe et al.,
2001; Rinkenauer et al., 2004) considered the LRP latency and
found that the faster the response time (RT), the earlier the LRP
peak. Only Brunia (2003) used a go/no-go task: they found that
under speed instructions the preparatory activity was enhanced
with respect to the instruction of being as fast and accurate as
possible. Considering the locus of SAT, these studies concluded
that SAT mechanism operated at the late motor stage, although
some effects were also detected at the premotor stage (Rinkenauer
et al., 2004). Finally, a recent MEG study using a face/house
categorization task described the timing of the decision processing
affected by SAT, and its dependence on sensory evidence (Wen-
zlaff et al., 2011). Emphasis on speed resulted in a higher acti-
vation of SMA and precuneus, whereas the left DLPFC showed
larger activity under accuracy than speed instructions, possibly
reflecting a higher level of accumulated evidence; however, they
did not find SAT effects in sensory areas.
Overall, these studies provide convergent, but also divergent
evidence. It is likely that the differences between results are caused
by differences in tasks (such as perceptual categorization vs.
Simon task), experimental designs (such as single trial cueing
vs. cuing blocks), signal analyses (stimulus-locked vs. response-
locked activity) and computational reference modeling. These
contrasting results call for further investigations of SAT, partic-
ularly using other tasks and other analyses. To this aim, in the
present study we investigated both pre- and post-stimulus SAT-
related processes by means of high-density EEG and stimulus-
locked analyses in a go/no-go task.
A key methodological difference with previous studies is that
we did not force subjects to emphasize speed or accuracy, rather
we sought to separately describe the neural processes subserving
speed or accuracy on the basis of the subjects’ spontaneous
behavioral tendency; thus, subjects were assigned a posteriori to
each group (high or low accuracy; fast or slow speed) based on
the observed performance. Spontaneous (idiosyncratic) employ-
ment of speed and accuracy strategies reflects, at least in part,
a trait disposition (Ashcraft and Faust, 1994; Ashcraft and Kirk,
2001; Szymura and Wodniecka, 2003; Flehmig et al., 2010); thus,
we thought that speed or accuracy behaviors could be better
unfolded in their habitual trend. A limit of the approaches based
on instructions manipulation is the individual differences in
copying with the instructions themselves; for example, a spon-
taneously fast subject can easily behave more slowly, while a
slow subject may have trouble to speed up. Consistently, these
two subjects may engage different cognitive resources to fulfill
with the instructions because of their basic dispositions, and
this could influence the individuation of the SAT-neural corre-
lates. Following this idea, we hypothesize that the idiosyncratic,
behaviorally measured, individual speed-disposition or accuracy-
disposition may reflect the dominance of a motor-related (in case
of speed-oriented subjects) vs. decision making-related (in case
of accuracy-oriented subjects) cortical mechanisms more clearly
than it can be observed in studies manipulating either the speed
or accuracy emphasis in the same subject. Moreover, we wonder
whether, using this approach, speed- and accuracy-related neural
processes were identifiable also at the perceptual level; this expec-
tation was not supported by fMRI and MEG literature, because
SAT-related effects were not found in sensory areas (Forstmann
et al., 2008b; Ivanoff et al., 2008; van Veen et al., 2008; Wenzlaff
et al., 2011). However, we hypothesize that the idiosyncratic
behavioral performance can also express at perceptual processing
level; this view was supported by previous event-related potentials
(ERPs) evidence from our group (Di Russo et al., 2006) showing
that the amplitude of the visual N1 evoked in a go/no-go task
was increased in subjects with very fast RTs. Further, we expected
to find a difference in the occurrence of a pre-movement brain
component, which might partly explain the performance in the
speed domain. Particularly, we hypothesized that this component
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could be represented by the prefrontal positivity (pP), previously
associated to the stimulus-response (S-R) mapping process (see,
e.g., Berchicci et al., 2014): indeed, if that component triggers the
response execution in the go trials, a latency modulation at that
level should predict the speed of the response execution, while an
amplitude modulation could reflect the quality of the subserved
processing, as probably reflected by the accuracy comparison.
METHODS
SUBJECTS
From a database of 130 subjects who participated in the go/no-
go task (described below), we firstly ordered them based on the
values of two behavioral parameters: (1) speed: the individual
median RTs of correct trials; and (2) accuracy: the individual
mean percentage of false alarms (FAs) (i.e., responses to no-
go stimuli). We calculated the quartiles from each data set (i.e.,
mean value for the lower and upper quartiles for RTs was 524
and 372 ms respectively; mean value for the lower and upper
quartiles for FAs was 18.00 and 2.18% respectively). Then, we
selected the groups of subjects falling into the lower (33 and
32 subjects for speed and accuracy, respectively) and upper (32
and 34 subjects for speed and accuracy, respectively) quartiles.
Afterwards, the groups were matched for age, gender and, most
important, for the value of the other reference parameter, i.e.,
the two Speed-groups were FA-matched, and the two Accuracy-
groups were RT-matched. Finally, we selected 63 participants
for the final groups, each of one was composed by about 21
subjects (see Table 1); 23 of them belonged to two groups.
Obviously, the main risk of this approach is that it does not
allow a perfect groups match according to demographic and
behavioral data, but it is important to note that in the final
groups the statistical differences were significant between the
reference parameter only (see Table 1). The demographic and
behavioral data of the four groups and their relative comparisons
(performed by t-test) are also shown in Table 1. The participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders; all of the subjects were
right-handed (Edinburgh handedness inventory; Oldfield, 1971).
After explanations of the procedures, all of the participants pro-
vided written informed consent, approved by the local ethical
committee.
PROCEDURE AND TASK
Subjects were tested in a sound attenuated, dimly lit room;
they were comfortably seated in front of a computer screen at
a distance of 114 cm, and a board was fixed on the armchair
allowing them to push freely the button panel positioned on it.
Four visual stimuli (i.e., four squared configurations made by
vertical and horizontal bars) were randomly presented for 260 ms
with equal probability (p = 0.25). Two stimuli were defined as
targets (go stimuli, p = 0.5), the other two were defined as non-
targets (no-go stimuli, p = 0.5). The stimulus-onset asynchrony
varied from 1 to 2 s to avoid time prediction effects on the RTs (for
more details on the paradigms, see Berchicci et al., 2012). All of
the participants were asked to be very accurate in discriminating
the stimuli and to press the button as fast as possible with the
right hand when a target appeared on the screen (go stimuli)
and withhold the response when a non-target appeared (no-go
stimuli). A minimum of 400 trials were recorded for both go and
no-go stimuli.
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDING AND DATA ANALYSIS
The EEG signal was recorded using BrainVisionTM system (Brain-
Products GmbH, Munich, Germany) with 64 electrodes mounted
according to the 10–10 international system. All electrodes were
referenced to the left mastoid. Horizontal and vertical electroocu-
logram (EOG) were also recorded using electrode at the right
external canthi and below the left eye, respectively. Electrode
impedances were kept below 5 KΩ. The EEG was digitized at
250 Hz, amplified (band-pass of 0.01–80 Hz including a 50 Hz
notch filter) and stored for offline averaging. Artifact rejection
was performed prior to signal averaging to discard epochs con-
taminated by blinks, eye movements or other signals exceeding
the amplitude threshold of±100 µV.
In order to investigate both the pre- and the post-stimulus
activities, the artifact-free signals were separately segmented into
go and no-go trials, and then averaged in 2000 ms epochs (from
1100 ms before to 900 ms after the stimulus onset). The baseline
was defined as the mean voltage during the initial 200 ms of
the averaged epochs. To further reduce high frequency noise, the
averaged signals were low pass filtered (i.e., Butterworth) at 25 Hz
(slope 24 dB/octave). All of the statistical analyses were separately
performed for Speed- and Accuracy-groups.
PRE-STIMULUS ACTIVITIES
Statistical differences in the pre-stimulus mean amplitude of
Speed- and Accuracy-groups were initially assessed with sample-
by-sample t-test in all electrodes in order to select the locations
and the time windows where the differences were consistently
significant.
Table 1 | Comparison of demographic and behavioral data in the Speed- and Accuracy-groups.
Speed Accuracy
Fast Slow t (p-value) Accurate Inaccurate t (p-value)
N . (males) 23 (18) 22 (15) 20 (14) 21 (16)
Age (SD) 34.4 (10.3) 39.9 (11.3) −1.7 (>0.05) 34.3 (12.2) 33.6 (13.4) 0.17 (>0.05)
RT (SD) 388 (34) 489 (30) −10.7 (<0.0001) 435 (47) 413 (57) 1.4 (>0.05)
FA (SD) 10.3 (7.7) 7.1 (5.3) 1.6 (>0.05) 2.3 (1.2) 15.4 (5.9) −9.7 (<0.0001)
Age is expressed years, RT in milliseconds and FA in percentage.
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For the Speed-groups, the mean amplitude on Cz derivation
in the −500/0 time window, reflecting the Bereitschaftspotential
(BP), was submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with Group
(Fast vs. Slow) and Condition (go vs. no-go) as factors.
Based on preliminary analysis on the Accuracy-groups, we
selected the following electrodes on the left (AF3-F3-F7-FC5)
and right (AF4-F4-F8-FC6) prefrontal cortex (PFC); the ERPs
recorded at these electrodes were averaged in order to obtain a
representative pool of activities in each hemisphere of the PFC.
The mean amplitude between 250 ms before and 50 ms after
stimulus onset at the two selected pools was submitted to a 2 × 2
× 2 ANOVA(Group × Pool × Condition). Post-hoc comparisons
were conducted using Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD)
test. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r coef-
ficients) were performed between behavioral and pre-stimulus
electrophysiological data for the Speed- and Accuracy-groups.
The overall α-level was fixed at 0.05.
POST-STIMULUS ACTIVITIES
Based on the peak electrodes, the typical post-stimulus ERPs
components were measured as follows: the P1 on PO8, the
N1 on PO7, the N2 on Cz, and the P3 on Pz and Cz in the
go and no-go condition, respectively. The peak amplitude and
latency of these components were submitted to separate 2 × 2
ANOVAs with Group (Fast vs. Slow or Accurate vs. Inaccurate)
as between factor and Condition (go vs. no-go) as within factor.
Post-hoc comparisons were conducted using Fisher’s LSD test. The
correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r coefficients) were performed
between behavioral and post-stimulus electrophysiological data;
further, in order to look for the relationship between pre- and
post-stimulus neural activities in the decision-making process, we
also performed the correlation analyses between the electrophysi-
ological data in both Speed- and Accuracy-groups. The results of
analyses will be reported only when they are significant (p< 0.05).
DIFFERENTIAL WAVES
In a study combining EEG and fMRI measures (Di Russo et al.,
2013b), it was showed that stimulus perception in the go/no-go
task triggers early activity in anterior insula, corresponding to the
pP component of the EEG. The positivity enhancement over the
frontopolar derivations was closely associated to the go condition
as triggering the response execution (Berchicci et al., 2014): it
started bilaterally 80 ms after the stimulus and peaked at 300–
350 ms, as also reported in a study with neurological patients (Di
Russo et al., 2013a).
In the present study, to better isolate the pP component, we
adopted the differential method subtracting the individual no-
go ERP from the go ERP of the same subject; the individual
subtraction waves were then separately averaged for Speed- and
Accuracy-groups. Obviously, the risk in adopting this method is
to indistinctly subtract different activities taking place in the same
period. In order to avoid this, we limited our analyses on the Fp1
and Fp2 sites in the time window following the stimulus appear-
ance. This method was motivated by the fact that we wanted
to emphasize the prefrontal positive activity, expecting to find
latency modulations as a consequence of difference in response
speed. We also looked at that component in the accuracy-groups,
in which the speed-match should not produce a modulation in
the peak latency.
The data were band pass filtered (1–20 Hz; slope 24 dB/octave)
to reduce the low-frequency noise and to facilitate the peak
detection. The visual inspection of the averaged differential waves
showed a positive peak at approximately 330 ms bilaterally over
the frontopolar electrodes (i.e., Fp1 and Fp2); since both topog-
raphy and latency of this difference wave were similar to that of
the pP elsewhere reported (Di Russo et al., 2013a,b; Berchicci
et al., 2014), this component will be called differential prefrontal
positivity (dpP) wave.
The onset latency (calculated as the first deflection larger than
twice the absolute value of the baseline mean) and the peak
amplitude and latency of the dpP were submitted to 2 × 2
ANOVAs with Group and Site (Fp1, Fp2) as factors, repeated for
both Speed- and Accuracy-groups. The correlation coefficients
(Pearson’s r coefficients) were computed between behavioral and
dpP data. The overall α-level was fixed at 0.05.
RESULTS
Figure 1 illustrates the ERP waveforms of both Speed-
(Figure 1A) and Accuracy-groups (Figure 1B) at three relevant
sites (AF4, Cz, PO8) for both go and no-go conditions. Time
0 represents the stimulus onset; inspection of the figure indi-
cates that these stimulus-locked ERPs using long pre-stimulus
analysis allow to appreciate the motor preparation activity, which
is usually obtained by the motor response-locked ERPs, called
movement-related cortical potentials (MRCPs).
PRE-STIMULUS ACTIVITIES
No differences were found between go and no-go conditions
before stimulus onset. In all groups, the prefrontal negativity
(pN) started about 800 ms before the stimulus appearance (see
AF4); 200 ms later, over Cz, emerged the BP that progressively
raised reaching its maximum at about 300 ms before the stim-
ulus onset. The BP component was larger in the fast than the
slow group, while the two Accuracy-groups had identical BP
component. By contrast, the pN was modulated by the accu-
racy only, i.e., the inaccurate group showed a larger negativ-
ity than accurate group. Figure 2A shows the topographical
distribution of the aforementioned pre-stimulus activities. The
activity over the medial frontal-central areas (likely the SMA)
in the fast group was larger than the slow group; on the other
hand, the inaccurate group showed a greater negativity than
the accurate over the PFC, especially in the right-hemisphere.
In order to visually enhance the presence of hemispheric dif-
ferences in the inaccurate group, Figure 2B shows the differ-
ential waves obtained over lateral PFC by subtraction of the
grand averaged ERP of accurate group from that of the inaccu-
rate.
With regards to the statistical analysis of the Speed-groups,
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Group on the BP time
window (F1,43 = 5.35, p < 0.05), which was larger in fast (−2.2
µV) than in slow (−1.3µV) group; at the opposite, no differences
emerged by analysis on the pN component (F1,43 = 0.33). For
the Accuracy-groups, ANOVA on the BP revealed no significant
effect of Group (F1,39 = 0.24), while the pN showed a main effect
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FIGURE 1 | Grand averaged waveforms of Speed- (A) and
Accuracy-groups (B) in the three relevant sites (AF4, Cz, PO8); time 0
corresponds to the stimulus onset. The different groups and task
conditions are superimposed with different colors. pN, prefrontal negativity;
BP, Bereitschaftspotential.
of Pool (F1,39 = 16.97, p = 0.0001) and a significant interaction
Group × Pool (F1,39 = 5.26, p < 0.05). Post hoc revealed that
the pN was larger (p < 0.05) in the inaccurate (−2.4 µV) than
accurate (−1.4 µV) group. Moreover, the pN amplitude at the
right side of the inaccurate group was larger than the left pN of
both inaccurate (p< 0.0001) and accurate (p< 0.01) groups.
Pearson’s analysis showed that the BP amplitude of the Speed-
groups correlated positively with the RTs (r = 0.33, p < 0.05);
on the other hand, the analysis on the Accuracy-groups showed
a significant correlation between the percentage of FAs and the
pN activity of the left (r = −0.34, p < 0.05) and especially right
(r = −0.48, p = 0.001) pools (Figure 3A). At the opposite, the
correlations were neither significant between RTs and BP in the
Accuracy-groups (r = 0.01, p > 0.05), nor between FAs and right
pN in the Speed-groups (r = −0.08, p > 0.05). These results
suggest that: (a) the larger the BP component, the faster the
behavioral response; and (b) the larger the pN activity (especially
on the right side), the worst the accuracy performance. Moreover,
significant correlations emerged between the BP and the pN in
both Speed- (r = 0.61, p< 0.0001) and Accuracy-groups (r = 0.4,
p< 0.01), pointing to an interaction between SMA and right PFC
activities.
POST-STIMULUS ERPs
After stimulus onset, the P1 and N1 components peaked at about
110 and 170 ms, respectively, on bilateral parietal-occipital sites
(PO7/PO8). At about 240 ms emerged the N2 peaking on medial
frontal sites (Cz). Finally, the P3 component peaked between
470 and 545 ms over medial parietal and frontal sites. Statistical
comparisons of the aforementioned components are shown in
Figure 3B.
P1 component
For the Accuracy-groups, ANOVA showed a larger amplitude of
the P1 in the accurate than inaccurate (F1,39 = 5.9, p = 0.01) group,
and the Pearson’s test revealed a negative correlation between P1
amplitudes and FAs percentages (r = −0.35, p < 0.05) indicating
that the amplitude was larger when the performance was more
accurate.
N1 component
For the Speed-groups, the N1 component was larger in the fast
than the slow group (F1,43 = 9.78, p< 0.01); further, its amplitude
positively correlated with RTs in both Speed- (r = 0.48, p< 0.001)
and Accuracy-groups (r = 0.36, p = 0.001), indicating that an
enhancement of this component was associated with faster RTs
in both cases.
N2 component
For the Speed-groups, ANOVA on the N2 component showed a
main effect of Condition (F1,43 = 47.75, p < 0.0001), indicating
that it was larger in no-go than go, and a main effect of Group
(F1,43 = 5.03, p < 0.05), reflecting a larger N2 in the fast than
slow group. For the Accuracy-groups, only the main effect of
Condition (F1,39 = 19.98, p < 0.0001) was present, which was
comparable to that observed for Speed-groups. Further, the N2
amplitude was positively correlated with the RTs in both Speed-
(r = 0.38, p < 0.001) and Accuracy-groups (r = 0.47, p < 0.001),
and negatively correlated with the FAs in both Speed- (r =−0.26,
p< 0.001) and Accuracy-groups (r = −0.28, p< 0.001). In other
words, larger N2 components were associated with faster RTs and
more errors in both groups.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Scalp topographies (top-flat view) of the grand averaged
pre-stimulus activities in the Speed- and Accuracy-groups. (B) Topographical
distribution in the −250/+50 ms time window and waveforms at relevant
sites of the left and right PFC pools of the differential activity in the
Accuracy-groups (inaccurate minus accurate group). Time 0 corresponds to
the stimulus onset.
P3 component
ANOVA on the Speed-groups showed a main effect of Group for
both P3 amplitude (F1,43 = 6.97, p = 0.01) and P3 latency (F1,43 =
7.46, p < 0.01), indicating an earlier and larger P3 component in
the fast than the slow group. In the Accuracy-groups the effects on
the P3 were not significant. Pearson’s analyses showed a negative
sign correlation between RTs and P3 amplitude of both Speed-
(r = −0.39, p < 0.001) and Accuracy-groups (r = −0.28, p <
0.01); further, the RTs was also positively correlated with the P3
latency of the Speed-groups (r = 0.27, p < 0.01) only. These
data indicate that faster responses were associated with earlier and
larger P3 peaks.
The results of the correlation analyses between electrophysio-
logical data in the Speed- and Accuracy-groups are reported in
Table 2. Overall, accuracy modulated the P1 and the N2 com-
ponents in two opposite ways. The more accurate performance
correlated with larger P1 amplitude and smaller N2 amplitudes.
Speed modulated the N1, N2 and P3 components; the larger
their amplitudes, the faster the RTs. For the P3 component, also
the latency was related to RTs speed (the shorter P3 latency, the
faster RTs).
DIFFERENTIAL WAVES
To enhance the go-related pP, the differential waves (go minus
no-go) were calculated on the frontopolar derivations (Fp1, Fp2),
limiting the analyses to the time window following the stimulus.
By this method, the no-go condition acted as baseline for the go
ERP in each subject: this procedure was motivated by the fact that
the pP activity was closely associated to the response trials (i.e.,
Go); furthermore, the adopted spatial and temporal restrictions
allowed us to isolate the known component without extending the
observation to unknowable and interpretable waves.
Figure 4 shows the difference waveforms (restricted to the
post-stimulus period) over the left prefrontal site (Fp1), in
which the dpP was largely pronounced. In the Speed-groups,
the dpP of the fast group started approximately 60 ms earlier
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Pre-stimulus activity. Left side: correlation scatterplot of the
RT with the BP amplitude in the Speed-groups. Right side: correlation
scatterplot of the FA with both the left and right PFC activity (indexed by the
pN) in the Accuracy-groups. (B) Post-stimulus activity: means and standard
deviations of the main ERPs components. From the upper left: P1 amplitude
in Accuracy-groups; N1 amplitude in Speed-groups; N2 amplitude in Speed-
groups; N2 amplitude in Accuracy-groups; P3 amplitude in Speed-groups; P3
latency in Speed-groups. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
than the slow group, and this difference partially remains until
the peak, which was reached at 309 and 351 ms by the fast
and slow group, respectively. Furthermore, the peak was larger
in the fast than slow group. On the other hand, the accu-
rate group had larger dpP than the inaccurate group, but
latency differences were not present. These trends were con-
firmed by the ANOVAs, which in the Speed-groups revealed
significant effects on the onset latency (F1,43 = 20, p < 0.0001),
peak latency (F1,43 = 8.3, p < 0.01) and peak amplitude
(F1,43 = 7.8, p < 0.01). For the Accuracy-groups, only the
peak amplitude was different between groups (F1,39 = 5.5,
p< 0.05).
Pearson’s analyses showed that the RTs were positively cor-
related with the onset latency of the Speed-groups (r = 0.46,
p = 0.001), and with the peak latency of both Speed- (r =
0.39, p < 0.01) and Accuracy-groups (r = 0.37, p < 0.05).
Moreover, significant negative correlation emerged between the
dpP amplitude and the RTs of the Speed-groups (r = −0.4, p <
0.01), confirming that the larger the dpP, the faster the response.
Overall, this differential wave enhancing go-related processing at
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Table 2 | Correlations (r-values) between ERP components in the Speed- and Accuracy-groups.
Speed-groups Accuracy-groups
pN N1 dpP latency P3 BP P1 N2
BP 0.61*** 0.43** 0.33* −0.57*** pN 0.4** 0.35* 0.43**
When not specified, the amplitude values are considered. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
prefrontal level was a sensitive marker of the efficiency of the
decision processing in both Speed- and Accuracy-groups.
DISCUSSION
This study aimed at identifying the neural processing stages asso-
ciated with the SAT using a novel approach, i.e., selecting subjects
based on their spontaneous speed or accuracy tendency rather
than manipulating speed or accuracy requirements. Moreover, we
recorded the frontal activity with a much more dense electrode
array than previous electrophysiological studies (Osman et al.,
2000; van der Lubbe et al., 2001; Sangals et al., 2002; Band et al.,
2003; Rinkenauer et al., 2004) allowing discrimination of two
different frontal activities in the temporal window before stimulus
onset. Finally, we considered the characteristics of ERP compo-
nents after stimulus, highlighting different levels of perceptual
processing associated with response speed or response accuracy.
FIGURE 4 | Go minus no-go difference wave: the differential prefrontal
positivity (dpP). Differential activity is reported for the left frontopolar
electrode (Fp1) for both Speed- (top) and Accuracy-groups (bottom). Time 0
represents stimulus onset.
PRE-STIMULUS ACTIVITIES
The anticipatory brain activities (the BP and pN components)
showed group differences depending on the speed or the accuracy
of the subsequent motor response. Fast and slow groups (matched
in accuracy) had different BP amplitudes and similar pN ampli-
tudes; at the opposite, accurate and inaccurate groups (matched
in speed) had different pN amplitudes and similar BP amplitudes.
The sources of these components were located in different areas of
the frontal cortex: the SMA for the BP component (Di Russo et al.,
2005; Berchicci et al., 2012), and the PFC for the pN (Berchicci
et al., 2013; Di Russo et al., 2013a,b). An enhanced SMA activity
in the last half second before the stimulus onset characterized
subjects with fast responses with respect to slow subjects. By
contrast, an enhanced rPFC activity starting 250 ms before the
stimulus onset characterized inaccurate subjects with respect to
very accurate subjects. Correlations between SMA amplitude and
RTs on one side, and between rPFC amplitude and accuracy on
the other further support the different roles played by these two
frontal areas into speed and accuracy processing. However, it is
noteworthy that the pre-stimulus activities were correlated (the
larger the BP, the larger the pN) within both Speed and Accuracy
groups, pointing to a stable relationship between SMA and rPFC
activity.
The enhanced SMA activity was associated with speed instruc-
tions in fMRI (Forstmann et al., 2008b; Ivanoff et al., 2008;
van Veen et al., 2008), MEG (Wenzlaff et al., 2011) and EEG
(Brunia and Vingerhoets, 1980; Band et al., 2003; Rinkenauer
et al., 2004) studies. Neurophysiologically, larger SMA activity
under speed constrain might contribute to overcome the tonic
inhibition provided by the output nuclei of basal ganglia (Lo and
Wang, 2006). Present findings showed that the subjects with a
spontaneous tendency to be fast had an enhanced SMA activity
starting 500 ms before the stimulus onset, suggesting that baseline
activity increased in fast performers. Indeed, a reduced baseline-
to-threshold distance could account for the shorter time needed
to reach a motor response (Bogacz et al., 2010).
On the other hand, it is still a matter of debate the role
played by prefrontal areas in the SAT processing, although the
engagement of the rPFC in the response accuracy is supported
by studies on the response inhibition (Garavan et al., 1999,
2002; Stuss et al., 2002), and the ability to differentiate correct
stimuli (Stuss et al., 2003), especially in tasks requiring sustained
attention (Wilkins et al., 1987; Glosser and Goodglass, 1990) such
as the present one. Present findings indicate that the rPFC activity
starting 250 ms before the stimulus onset was accuracy-related
(larger in the inaccurate than accurate group).
Based on present results, we propose that: (1) speed and accu-
racy tendencies are settled by the activity of two distinct frontal
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areas (the SMA and rPFC, respectively) long before the stimulus
onset (for this reason called “baseline”); and (2) although there is
a trade-off between SMA and rPFC activities (i.e., the BP and pN
were correlated), it is not total: indeed, each group was marked by
amplitude differences in only one component, without affecting
the other. Thus, two interacting but separate neurocognitive sys-
tems may represent the basis of the individual tendencies under-
lying the baseline modulation of different baseline-to-threshold
systems. In the “speed system” (modulated by the SMA), the
increased baseline could lead to fast responses, while in the
“accuracy system” (modulated by the rPFC) the increased baseline
could lead to inaccurate performance, because of the reduced
possibility of accumulating sufficient evidences until threshold
reaching. Thus, we propose that SAT is the result of the co-
activation of the two interacting systems. Indeed, considering the
anatomo-functional connections between the SMA and rPFC (for
a review see Aron, 2011), it could be proposed that an increased
baseline activity in the SMA-rPFC network leads to fast and
inaccurate performance, while the decreased baseline accounts for
the trade-off in the sense of slow and accurate responses.
POST-STIMULUS ACTIVITIES
Data on post-stimulus activities are consistent with the view that
accuracy- or speed-related individual tendency might affect also
the activity of visual cortical areas. We observed a dissociation
of the two visual components P1 and N1, which had larger
amplitudes in the accurate and fast groups than slow and inaccu-
rate groups, respectively. The dissociation was further confirmed
by the correlation analyses, showing that larger P1 amplitude
was associated with high accuracy, and larger N1 amplitude was
associated with high speed.
A vast literature showed that spatial attention produces an
amplification of stimulus-evoked activity in extrastriate areas
and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) during the 80–250 ms fol-
lowing the stimulus onset (Luck et al., 1990; Clark and Hill-
yard, 1996; Wijers et al., 1997; Hillyard et al., 1998; Martínez
et al., 1999; Di Russo et al., 2003). These studies support the
“early selection” theories of visual-spatial attention (Bashinski
and Bacharach, 1980; Johnston and Dark, 1986; Downing, 1988;
Hillyard and Anllo-Vento, 1998); however a different role of the
P1 and N1 components should be considered (Luck et al., 1990).
The P1 component enhancement represents facilitation at the
early sensory processing level for items presented at attended
location (Di Russo et al., 2003), while the N1 component is
associated with the discrimination processes within the focus of
attention (Luck et al., 1990; Vogel and Luck, 2000). In addi-
tion to the modulation of the extrastriate areas, visual attention
control relies on a network of cortical and subcortical regions,
including the DLPFC and PPC, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and
the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus (Mesulam, 1990; Nobre
et al., 1997). Thus, it is likely that the modulations of the
visual areas observed in the present study are part of a percep-
tual decision-making process, starting with pre-stimulus baseline
adjustments and ending up with the response threshold reaching.
We propose that individual speed- and accuracy-oriented neural
strategies provide “bias signals” that exert a selective amplifica-
tion of sensory information flow in different visual pathways.
Support to this hypothesis comes from a single cell recording
(Heitz and Schall, 2012) showing that the SAT-related cues
induced a shift of baseline firing rates in the visually responsive
neurons of the frontal eye field (FEF). At the same time, under
the framework of the drift-diffusion models, recent studies (Rae
et al., 2014; Zhang and Rowe, 2014) suggest that not only the
boundary threshold but also other parameters are affected by the
speed or accuracy; for example, it was proposed that emphasis
on accuracy increased the allocation of attention on the task (i.e.,
the drift rate) and the non-decision time, i.e., the time reserved to
the stimulus encoding. These latter hypotheses are consistent with
the present findings, pointing to a greater allocation of visual-
spatial attention in the accurate group, as revealed by the P1
amplitude. Further studies are needed to shed light into the brain
networks underlying the speed- and accuracy-oriented perceptual
processes, as indexed by the P1-N1 modulation.
Difference between groups was also observed for the N2
component: it was larger in the fast than slow group, showing
also the “typical” no-go enhancement (e.g., Donkers and van
Boxtel, 2004). The N2 modulation is generally described as an
index of inhibitory control (e.g., van Boxtel et al., 2001) or as
conflict monitoring between go and no-go stimuli (Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2003; Donkers and van Boxtel, 2004). However, we will not
discuss the N2 data in these terms, because in a recent study (Di
Russo et al., 2013b) combining ERP and fMRI measures using
the same paradigm of the present one, we found that the no-go
condition did not produce larger activity than the go condition
in any brain areas, indicating that the no-go N2 cannot be the
expression of extra (inhibitory or conflict-related) activity, but
more likely the summation of negative and positive waveforms
originating in premotor, prefrontal and parietal areas in the same
time period (200–400 ms after the stimulus). Further studies are
required to clarify this issue, which is outside the scope of present
work.
The P3 component, usually described as an index of the stim-
ulus categorization process (Mecklinger and Ullsperger, 1993),
started earlier and was larger in the fast than slow group,
whereas no differences emerged between accurate and inaccurate
groups. The correlation analyses further confirmed the relation-
ship between the RT and the P3 component, suggesting that the
P3 could also provide an estimation of the stimulus evaluation
time that is closely related to the response processing time.
Finally, are crucial the effects found on the prefrontal pP. We
confirmed that this newly discovered components, compared to
no-go, is larger in the go condition as previously described by
our group (Di Russo et al., 2013a,b; Berchicci et al., 2014). The
neural generator of the pP was localized in the anterior Insula
in a study combining fMRI and ERP data collected with the
same task used in the present study (Di Russo et al., 2013b),
and its function would be to trigger the response when enough
information are accumulated. Other studies showed that insular
activation indicates the stimulus-response (S-R) association to
guide response selection (Boettiger and Dand’Esposito, 2005),
and reflects both self and motor awareness (Berti et al., 2005).
In the present study, we additionally adopted the subtraction
method to better focus on the pP modulation on prefrontal sites:
the main risk of this procedure is to compare different activities
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acting in the same period. For this reason, our analyses and
interpretation were limited to the differential activity resulting
from the frontopolar derivations in the time window follow-
ing the stimulus. In line with our predictions, we observed a
positive component, called dpP, peaking at about 330 ms after
the stimulus: thus, differential analyses further confirmed the
presence of a positive activity closely related to the response
execution, as previously observed in other studies (Di Russo
et al., 2013a,b; Berchicci et al., 2014). Taking into account these
views and the present data, we suggest that the dpP might
reflect the S-R mapping finalized to the response execution in
a perceptual discrimination task, representing the final stage of
the decision process before the movement onset. Analyses on the
dpP showed that the latency of this differential wave reflects the
speed of the decision-making processing. Indeed, the dpP started
earlier in the fast than slow group (see Figure 4), explaining
about the 60% of the RT difference between the two groups.
Moreover, the dpP wave was larger in both fast and accurate
groups than their respective counterparts, suggesting that its
amplitude reflects the efficiency of the decision process in both
cases.
SPEED AND ACCURACY DECISION SYSTEMS: AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW
In summary, present results showed different brain activities both
before and after stimulus onset in Speed- and Accuracy-groups.
Pre-stimulus activity in the SMA and rPFC seems to reflect the
baseline modulation of the speed and accuracy decision systems:
they are interacting, as revealed by present analyses and anatomo-
functional connections between SMA and rPFC (for a review see
Aron, 2011). Thus, we suggest that the typical trade-off between
response speed and accuracy is accounted by the baseline activity
in the SMA-rPFC network. A baseline increase in this network
could prepare subjects to fast and inaccurate performance, while
a reduced baseline may predict slow and accurate performance
because of the greater baseline-to-threshold distance in both the
speed and accuracy systems. In addition, we showed that the
speed and accuracy baselines can also be separately modulated,
leading to either high or low group performance in one system
without affecting (or affecting very little) the other, as indicated
by comparable mean performance in the other system. Thus,
as previously suggested, the two systems should be considered
interacting but not totally dependent. Finally, after stimulus
onset, ERP components reflecting perceptual processing, S-R
mapping and stimulus categorization were also differentially
affected by speed and accuracy idiosyncratic tendencies.
Overall, the present study suggests that the motor response
in a perceptual discrimination task should be considered as the
final output of a series of neurocognitive processes starting long
before the stimulus onset. For this reason, and based on our
results, we sketched in Figure 5 the time course of the main
processes supporting the go/no-go task. Obviously, all brain areas
were active in both speed and accuracy processing; however, some
areas were more involved in the speed with respect to accuracy
system, and we tried to distinguish them by using different colors.
Before stimulus onset the baseline activity of the speed and
accuracy systems was modulated by the SMA (reflected by the
BP) and the rPFC (reflected by the pN), respectively. Even if
FIGURE 5 | Sketch of the processing in the preparation-perception-
action cycle and associated brain areas as a function of time (not
scaled). Obviously the same brain areas were involved in both speed-
(orange) and accuracy (blue)- processing; however, the activity of some
areas was more affected by either one or the other condition: the orange
and blue lines depict the two main flows within speed and accuracy
systems. SMA = supplementary motor area, rPFC = right prefrontal cortex,
PPC = posterior parietal cortex.
the activity of these prefrontal areas was correlated (accounting
for the interaction between the two systems), the larger SMA
activity marked only the fast group, while the larger rPFC activ-
ity marked only the inaccurate group. About 110 ms after the
stimulus onset, the early sensory processing of the extrastriate
areas (P1 component) was modulated by the accuracy level, with
the accurate group focusing greater attention to the attended
location. Immediately after, extrastriate visual and parietal areas
(N1 component) showed a more intense processing, likely cor-
responding to the discrimination stage, in the fast than the slow
group. Because of this enhanced sensory processing, the response-
oriented S-R mapping in the anterior Insula (as reflected by the
dpP) was reached earlier and Insula activity was larger in fast
with respect to slow group; moreover, also accuracy affected the
anterior Insula activity (larger dpP in the accurate than inaccurate
group), although its activity was not directly correlated with the
rPFC modulation. In a time window around 400 ms, the activity
corresponding to the stimulus categorization in the PPC (P3
component) and response execution in the case of go stimuli, was
especially affected by response speed.
Summarizing, present data suggest that the behavioral speed-
accuracy trade-off (SAT) is explained by the neurocognitive
processing of two “decision systems”, starting to work before
the stimulus appearance and reflecting the neural substrate of
idiosyncratic tendencies. A limitation of the present study is that
we did not observe if speed is traded for accuracy (or vice versa) at
a single-subject level, and we matched the groups by a posteriori
criteria based on behavioral performance; however, considering
that task instructions equally emphasized speed and accuracy,
we thought it might represent a sort of spontaneous sorting,
enhancing idiosyncratic individual tendency.
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